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UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
A significant piece of legislation, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act,' introduced for the second time in 1978, has been held over for
consideration by the 1979 General Assembly. Passed by the Senate in 1977,
the bill implementing the Act was killed in the House that year because,
according to the bill's patron, Senator Joseph V. Gartlan, Jr., the short
session in 1977 failed to provide sufficient time for House members to study
the legislation. But Senator Gartlan is optimistic about the bill's chances
in 1979 and this Comment proposes not only to explicate the major provi-
sions of the Act but also to urge its swift passage. Designed to protect the
interests of children caught in the tragic web of feuding relatives and
endless custody litigation, the Act is the sine qua non insuring that custody
determinations no longer will be circumscribed by the barbaric notion that
"to the possessor belong the spoils."'
Approved in 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association, the Act has since been
adopted in seventeen states.3 Commentators have been unanimously en-
thusiastic4 and, clearly, the Act's purposes leave little room for negativism.
It is intended to: (1) avoid the jurisdictional competition which has
marked many custody battles to the serious detriment of the children
involved; (2) promote cooperation with courts of other states; (3) assure
that custody litigation normally takes place in the state with which the
child and the family have the most significant connections and where the
maximum amount of evidence relating to the child's care and relationships
is available; (4) discourage serial re-opening of custody disputes; (5) deter
"child snatching" and other removals of children undertaken to obtain or
regain custody; (6) avoid re-litigation of out-of-state custody decisions; (7)
facilitate the enforcement of properly adjudicated, out-of-state custody
1. S. B. 399, Gen. Assembly, 1978 Sess., (proposed Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-124 through 20-
146). See generally 9 U.L.A. 99 (1973).
2. Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGs L. J. 1011 (1977).
3. Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Wyo-
ming.
4. See e.g. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Rem-
edy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207 (1969); Foster & Freed,
supra note 2; Podell, Peck & First, Custody to Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51 (1973);
Walther, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 161 (1971); Note,
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: An Attempt to Stop Child Rustling, 12 WELAMrr
L. J. 623 (1976).
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decrees; (8) promote cooperation between courts of all states concerned
with the same child; (9) unify the law of adopting states.'
The basic scheme of this legislation is that one court assumes responsi-
bility for custody decisions involving a particular child. Under normal
circumstances, this court is one in the "home state" of the child. The home
state is that state in which the child lived with parents, a parent, or a
person acting as parent, for at least six months preceding the. time in-
volved.' The jurisdiction of the home state court continues for six months
after removal of the child if a parent or person acting as parent remains in
the home state.7 This provision, coupled with the stipulation that physical
presence of the child ". . . while desirable, is not a prerequisite for juris-
diction . . .." precludes the courts of any state adopting the Act from
exercising custody jurisdiction in the "snatch and run" cases where one
parent has removed the children from their physical custodian in the home
state and seeks custody in a second state. These provisions also mean that
in cases where a couple separates after living in state A for at least six
months, and one spouse moves with the children to state B, the remaining
spouse can file for custody in the home state, state A, within six months
and the courts in state B are then precluded from acting. These provisions
are consistent with the theory behind state long-arm statutes and provide
that the home state nexus to the basis for adjudication of custodial status
even if the child is not present.
The legislation contains a "clean hands" provision which allows a court
to decline to exercise jurisdiction where the petitioner has wrongfully taken
the child from another state.' Furthermore, the act mandates refusal to
entertain the action where the petitioner has taken or retained the child
in violation of a court decree, unless sufficient conditions exist to bring into
play the Act's provision for jurisdiction by emergency, a very limited ex-
ception to the normal jurisdictional requirements."
The major focus of the Act is to insure that custody disputes will be
handled in a state where the maximum amount of evidence exists to aid
the court in its determination. Thus, where there is no clear home state,
the Act provides that a court may ". . . assume jurisdiction because (i)
the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
5. S. B. 399, Gen. Assembly, 1978 Sess., § 20-124 [hereinafter cited as Bill]; 9 U.L.A. 103
§ 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Act].
6. Bill § 20-125 (5); Act § 2 (5).
7. Bill § 20-126 (A) (1); Act § 3 (a) (1).
8. Bill § 20-126 (C); Act § 3 (c).
9. Bill § 20-131 (A); Act § 8 (a).
10. Bill §§ 20-126 (A) (3), -131 (B); Act §§ 3 (a) (3), 8 (b).
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significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this
State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships . . .,.
Where possibilities exist for conflicting jurisdiction under the Act, the
doctrines of priority in time'2 and forum non conveniens', 3 are applied. The
Act also provides for courts to render full assistance to each other by
providing documents," testimony in deposition form,'" social histories, 6 or
by ordering the appearance of any necessary parties."
Two important factors of the legislation are its provisions making a
custody decree rendered under proper jurisdictional requirements binding
on all parties served in this state or notified under the Act"8 and its provi-
sions for recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees ren-
dered under proper jurisdictional requirements."0 This interstate recogni-
tion of custody decrees rendered under the Act's jurisdictional require-
ments meets the minimum contacts test outlined by the Supreme Court
whether the custody action is viewed as one in personam or in rem2 and
fairness standards are insured by the Act's provisions for notice. 1
One of the major impediments to stable, permanent custody decisions
has been the notion that custody is a status freely modifiable. Thus, cus-
tody decrees have been viewed as non-final and in no way subject to foreign
enforcement under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.22
The sections providing for recognition and enforcement of foreign custody
decrees, together with that disallowing modification of the custody decrees
properly rendered in other states unless the foreign court has declined to
exercise jurisdiction to modify, would change the trend of case law in
Virginia and across the country and afford children the stability so neces-
sary to healthy development. Most experts agree that ". . . poor parental
models are easier to adapt to than ever shifting ones, '23 and advocate that
11. Bill § 20-126 (A) (2); Act § 3 (a) (2).
12. Bill § 20-129; Act § 6.
13. Bill § 20-130; Act § 7.
14. Bill §§ 20-140, -145; Act §§ 17, 22.
15. Bill § 20-141; Act § 18.
16. Bill § 20-142; Act § 19.
17. Bill §§ 20-142, -143; Act §§ 19, 20.
18. Bill § 20-135; Act § 12.
19. Bill § 20-136; Act § 13.
20. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
21. Bill § 20-128; Act § 5.
22. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (the dissenter, Jackson, J., emphasized
that the majority's approach reduced ". . . the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run."
Id. at 542); Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974).
23. A. Watson, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968).
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custody decisions once made should be immutable for at least one or two
years. The Act does not provide any escape hatch for having custody
decisions changed unless the child's situation amounts to an emergency
but if the experts are correct, a somewhat inadequate but permanent par-
ental figure may be less harmful to a child than the confusion resulting
from even infrequent custody changes.
This legislation represents a major step toward protecting our children
in a society of increasing mobility and shifting family relationships. A
workable substitute for self-help, its adoption will mark a maturing of our
legal system. It not only covers such cases as the famous Mellon snatches2
but also the more prevalent separation, divorce, parental death and aban-
donment situations. It will prevent children from being pawns in a game
of parental revenge or the victims of punitive custody decrees, "awarded"
to one parent because the other has defied a court order with the "dignity
of the court" taking precedence over the interests of the child.21 If the
welfare of the child is truly of paramount importance in custody litigation,
then we should heed the experts and end the judicial trend of easy modifi-
cation of custody decrees. Such a change will have the effect of increasing
the care used and the sense of responsibility felt by the judge in each case.
The mandates for cooperation among courts of the various states where the
evidence exists will insure that the judge has the full facts before him. Can
we offer our children anything less?
Emily M. Trapnell
24. See R. Levy, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DrvoRcE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
(1969); ALLEN, FERSTER & J. RUBIN, READINGS ON LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 319-22 (1968).
25. After a separation in Pennsylvania awarding custody to the father, Mrs. Mellon, in
1974, illegally removed the children to New York and, in 1976, was given custody by a New
York court. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mellon engineered a spectacular heist of the children,
including armed agents and private planes. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
26. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1238-39.
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